. Notwithstanding these contrary trends, criminologists frame crime trends since the 1990s within the paradigm of a 'crime drop' (Blumstein and Wallman, 2005; Goldberger and Rosenfeld, 2008) , and have generally neglected the possibility that official statistics are an increasingly incomplete reflection of the extent of criminal activity in the United States. This paper explores the implications of that possible omission.
In this paper, we delineate the extent of our knowledge and data concerning Online Property Crime (OPC) and offer an alternative view of property crime trends generally while pointing out the glaring gap in crime reporting and accounting in relation to the crimes perpetrated online, which are likely growing in number. In addition, we compare estimated costs of traditional property crime to those of OPC. Finally, we identify the main challenges in obtaining reliable data on OPC, especially when applying the traditional methods of compiling crime statistics. The framework offered in the current article challenges the traditional perception of property crime as following the same downward trend as violent crime. It is our hope that the discussion started here will facilitate efforts to gather relevant information to track the trends in OPC more accurately.
DEFINING AND COUNTING ONLINE PROPERTY CRIME 1 We use the term Online Property Crime to cover a wide variety of property crimes perpetrated online including identity theft, credit card theft and fraud, cyber attacks on organizational networks resulting in security breaches, the buying and selling of personal 1 We are grateful to one of our anonymous reviewers for raising several of the definitional points in this section.
data online, and the use of unsuspecting people's computers for spamming/phishing/illegal hosting (see Cheney, 2003 Cheney, , 2005 Anderson et al., 2012 for the discussion of definitions and types of online property offenses). Two aspects of this definition are worth highlighting: that OPC is perpetrated online, and that it involves the theft of property. We discuss the importance of these distinctions below.
Defining a crime as 'perpetrated online' is not a simple matter. Some types of OPC have a significant offline component. For example, identity theft and credit card fraud can and often do result from "dumpster diving", theft from mailboxes, or stealing relatives' personal information through paper documents (Allison et al., 2005; Elbirt, 2005; White and Fisher, 2008; Copes and Vieraitis, 2009; Morris, 2010) . When fraudulent transactions are reported, it is often impossible to infer exactly how the information was obtained, or even how it was exploited. Accordingly, in our review of the data that follows, we are at pains to distinguish between sources which focus exclusively on crime perpetrated online, as our definition requires, and those which aggregate data on an overlapping, but distinct, quantity of criminal activity.
Establishing that property was taken in a perpetration of an online crime is also complex. If the 'property' at issue is a person's identity, a problem is created because some victims of online identity theft never become aware that their details have been stolen, and indeed do not lose their identity so much as 'share' it with the criminal.
Others may have their details exploited to obtain products or services but will suffer no direct loss themselves -arguably a crime more similar to defamation than 'theft', at least as far as the original owner of the data is concerned. Equally, online property crime may result in no direct profit to the criminal in cases where, rather than seeking financial payouts, the criminal steals intellectual property which may then be exploited in other ways. Accordingly, as we review the data that follows, we consider the types of property at issue and problems related to the quantification of property lost.
Additionally, other factors may bias or inhibit full documentation of OPC.
Insurance company requirements that victims report losses to the police may bias data in favor of higher value losses, while the active encouragement to report fraud offered by websites such as eBay may have other skewing effects (see House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2007, p.110) . Equally, changing technology itself may influence target selection by criminals. As Biderman and Reiss noted in 1967, crime data produced by organizations responsible for policing or adjudication "are not some objectively observable universe of 'criminal acts', but rather those events defined, captured, and processed as such by some institutional mechanism" (p. 1). Accordingly, we sought to remain continually vigilant of what is referred to elsewhere as the 'dark figure' problemthat is, factors that cause reported statistics to diverge from (and generally underrepresent) the true nature and extent of crime.
Notwithstanding these significant challenges, there is a pressing need to count online property crime for two reasons. First, it is likely that it is increasing. Internet usage has increased dramatically in the United States in recent decades, such that in September of 2012, 81% of American adults and 95% of teens accessed the internet (Pew Research Center, 2013) . This change can be reasonably compared to other expansions of human activity through time and space. Melbin (1978) showed how the expansion of human activities past dusk, facilitated by the introduction of electric lighting into newly settled territories in the West, had an impact on crime. Every time human activity crosses new 'frontiers', crime seems to follow. Second, the potential harm from OPC is unknown. In the case of property crime, 'harmfulness' is almost always quantified in terms of the financial losses accrued by the victim (Davies, 2012) . Data on losses from property crime are, in fact, regularly published by the FBI, though no facility is provided to allow a breakdown of online vs.
offline crimes which, alongside other concerns about the representativeness of the FBI's data, makes it impossible to check how much harm OPC is causing or to relate it to more familiar measures such as the financial harm caused by other thefts. Accordingly, rendering a reasonably satisfactory picture of the quantity of financial losses that accrue from OPC is critical to our ability to track its seriousness as a social problem.
Detecting the 'true' extent of OPC poses questions that are not only conceptual, therefore, but also methodologically technical. In what follows, we consider specifically the limitations of official statistics, victimization surveys and other approaches to data collection when applied to the problem of counting OPC in order to make the case that greater attention should be devoted to assessing the harmfulness and prevalence of OPC in the United States.
THE SIZE OF THE PROBLEM: HOW PREVALENT IS OPC?
At the same time as traditional property crime has fallen nationally, the online market for personal and financial data has formed (see Holt and Lampke, 2010 for an empirical study of such online marketplaces). After 2004, according to Moore and his colleagues (2009) , identity theft and credit card fraud became increasingly organized and elaborate, evolving from a problem of 'insiders' with access to sensitive information (such as store attendants) to one with a novel division of labor. Phishermen (and sometimes spammers) would send out emails and viruses to attract naïve customers to fake bank web sites requesting a person to enter their bank account number and password for 'confirmation' or to avoid 'suspension of the account'. Botnet herders would manipulate infected computers to gather keystroke information and to direct these computers -unbeknownst to their owners -to execute specific programs, host fake web sites and online pharmacies, and send out spam emails. Brokers and cashiers would buy bank account information in bulk and would in turn hire unsuspecting money mules (through job advertisements for positions of 'transaction processor' or 'account executive') to accept money transfers from these stolen bank accounts into their own accounts, keep a commission, and then irretrievably transfer the rest of the money through Western Union (or other untraceable means) to the cashiers (Moore, Clayton, and Anderson, 2009 ). In 2011, Symantec reported the price for 10,000 bots (infected computers acting as 'robots' on commands) was around $15, while stolen credit card numbers could fetch between $0.07 and $100 each (Symantec, 2011, p. 6) .
When it comes to understanding the scope and incidence of conventional, nononline crime types, criminal justice researchers and professionals have several options.
Traditional ways of measuring crime include official statistics from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), victimization survey data (from both individuals and businesses affected), and self-reported crime and delinquency from various sources (though there is no uniform nationally representative survey of self-reported crime involvement with large samples of adults -see Addington, 2010 , for an overview.) Of the three main sources of crime measurement, official statistics and victimization data are, at least in theory, most relevant for providing information about the extent of OPC. Additionally, these are the only sources of data that presently have the potential to derive national estimates of the scope of the problem in the United States.
The differences between measures of crime reported to (and by) the police reproduced in the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program and measures of victimization gleaned from NCVS have been analyzed and dissected extensively (Biderman and Lynch, 1991; Loftin and McDowall, 2010; Lynch and Addington, 2007; Mosher, Miethe, and Phillips, 2002; Savitz, 1978; Skogan, 1977 Skogan, , 1984 Xie et al., 2006; Zawitz et al., 2003) . This literature has two lessons with particular relevance for interpreting data in relation to OPC. First, existing research shows consistently that a much smaller proportion of victims of property crime report their victimization compared to victims of violent crime. Second, the most prominent reasons that victims of property crime do not report their victimization are threefold: the crime or its resultant losses are minor enough that they are not worth the time and effort of reporting, the property was recovered, or victims do not believe police could help recover the property (Skogan, 1984; Harlow, 1985; Hart & Rennison, 2003) . Accordingly, when assessing the validity of data on the prevalence of OPC nationally, existing research suggests strongly that the extent of the problem will be underestimated in official statistics (White & Fisher, 2008) , and that there will be an overrepresentation of high-loss crimes 2 .
According to the broad consensus among criminology researchers, backed up by the UCR reports, property crime has been declining since the early 1990s in the United
States (Blumstein and Wallman, 2005; Levitt, 2004; Mishra and Lalumière, 2009; Zimring, 2006) as well as internationally (Mishra and Lalumière, 2009; Tseloni et al., 2010) . Of course, OPC does not appear as a specific category in the Uniform Crime
Report estimates compiled by the FBI, upon which so much research and speculation regarding crime trends are based (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013). Rather the observation of this decline in property crime is based on counts of burglary, larcenytheft, motor vehicle theft, and (to a limited extent) arson.
Several explanations have been offered to account for the overall crime decline.
Levitt (2004) summarized the most commonly cited hypotheses for the fall in crime rates: increased imprisonment; the aging of the population (i.e., the drop in the proportion of high-risk youth); improved economic conditions; innovative police strategies (e.g., 'hot spots' and 'community policing'); changes in gun control laws; increased use of the death penalty; increased numbers of police officers; the legalization of abortion and attendant reduced number of unwanted, at-risk children; and the decline in crack-cocaine consumption. Levitt's list is not exhaustive; others have suggested that growths in immigration may account for a reduction in crime (Wadsworth, 2010), particularly violent offending, or that changes in "youth culture," observed by qualitative researchers in inner-city neighborhoods, may also explain the crime drop (Curtis, 1998) . While a few of these explanations find more empirical support than others, in reality the crime decline debate remains largely unresolved and the trends are "murkier" than much of the existing literature suggests (Baumer and Wolff, 2014) . Table 1 ; Baum, 2004; Langton, 2011; Langton & Planty, 2010; Harrell & Langton, 2013) . At the same time, Piquero and her colleagues concluded that the "number of households being victimized annually rang[es] between 5% and 25%" (Piquero, Cohen, and Piquero, 2011, p. 437) . These figures do contain some indication that identity theft rates are rising (see Table 1 ). Regrettably, however, neither source collected information regarding the mode of perpetration of the crimes in question. It is important to underscore a critical difference in the ways the prevalence of online property crime is measured in available sources. Whereas the NCVS measures the 'number of victimizations' per 100 individuals aged 12+, the data do not account for whether the same or different individuals were victimized. As a result, the numbers do not actually tell us what percentage of individuals are affected by online property crime, but only the rate at which victimization incidents occurred. The best estimates for the rates at which people are actually affected by online property crime suggest it affects between 4.4% and 6.0% of the adult population annually (Javelin Strategy & Research, 2012) , or between 5.5% and 7.3% of households nationally, according to NCVS data (Langton, 2011). conducted annually. Reports detailing the results of the survey have been issued every year since 2005 (see Table 1 ).
[ Table 1 about here] Javelin sought to break down its 2008 data on identity theft by method of perpetration, an effort which was hampered by the fact that 65% of victims in that year did not know how their information had been obtained (Javelin, 2009) . Only 4% of victims knew they had lost their data online, while a further 4% believed it had been lost through a data breach.
Meanwhile, fully 15% believed their identities had been compromised after their wallet was stolen. Javelin's conclusion, that most identity theft occurs offline, was in line with other research, but suffers from the flaw that victims of OPC are far less likely to know or understand how their information was compromised than are victims who are aware they lost their wallets.
Fewer than 20% of the identity theft victims sampled by NCVS reported their victimization to law enforcement agencies (Langton and Planty, 2010 theft or credit card fraud reported their victimization (Huff, Desilets, and Kane, 2010, p. 16 ).
[ Table 2 about here] Table 2 summarizes the estimates of reporting to police derived from NCVS and the NW3C survey and compares them to the reporting of traditional property crime to police (based on NCVS data). Identity theft victimization is reported to police at a significantly lower rate -around 20% -compared to the proportion of people who report their victimizations from traditional property crime to police -about 40%, according to NCVS data (Truman, 2011) . Moreover, one important consideration makes this difference in reporting a conservative estimate: neither NCVS nor the NW3C survey separate identity theft that is perpetrated online from that which results from "dumpster in between 27% and 40% of cases depending on the year (see Table 2 ). However, the FTC data, besides having the same problem of non-separation of online crimes, also have another serious flaw: they clearly cannot be considered representative of all victims of fraud and identity theft, but rather represent (at best) only those individuals reaching out to the data collection agency. 5 The most that can be said for these data, therefore, is that among those who take the step of voluntarily reporting their victimization to the FTC, reporting to the police also appears more common. In sum, the picture from available data sources suggests that OPC affects a sizeable and growing proportion of households annually in comparison to traditional property crime, but that reporting rates to police are relatively low. Moreover, OPC levels and trends are not counted at all in the FBI's UCR metric, which is most commonly used to assess crime levels and trends in the United States. Rather, the only available sources for national estimates of the prevalence of the problem are victimization surveys. Next, we assess the level of damage that OPC precipitates on its victims.
Victims of internet

THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM: HOW MUCH DOES OPC COST?
Estimates that clearly shows losses from online crime far surpass those from traditional crime (see Table 3 ) and that the proportion of people or households financially affected by OPC is substantial.
[ Table 3 Second, the UCR estimates include financial losses from property crime against both individuals and organizations but only from the crimes that were reported to the police. Even though only less than half of all property crime is reported to the police 6 As an example, based on a series of studies commissioned by Symantec and conducted by the Ponemon Institute (2012) where large U.S. companies (over 2000 employees per company) were surveyed, the average financial loss from data breach incidents per year per company is estimated to be $8.9 million. However, this estimate cannot be easily translated into a national total because of the method by which the sample was drawn.
(according to NCVS estimates), the figures for financial losses cannot be assumed to be representative of losses for all such crimes because one of the main reasons some property crimes are not reported to law enforcement is the insignificance of losses (as described above, in the section on prevalence of OPC). However, to adjust for this possibility, a crude estimate is offered in Table 3 as a proxy -the doubling of the officially reported losses. Even adopting this liberal approach, which likely overstates the true amount of total losses from traditional property crime adjusting for non-reporting, the resulting estimates are still much lower than the estimated direct losses caused by identity theft (see Table 3 ).
To summarize, the financial losses attributable to identity theft appear far in excess of the damage inflicted by traditional property crime, though there is no clear indication of the role of online perpetration in these data, or of whether levels of online perpetration are rising or falling in recent years. Nevertheless, we believe the data reviewed above do constitute a prima facie case that OPC rates and losses may be comparable to, or even greater than, those from traditional property crime in recent years.
PUZZLE FOR THE NEW AGE: HOW SHOULD WE COUNT ONLINE PROPERTY CRIME?
The UCR was designed to count the kinds of direct contact predatory crimes typical of the 1940's and 1950's, where victims and offenders came together in time and space. Today, victims and offenders can meet in cyberspace and the authorities that may be able to do something about it are often private corporations rather than police, who have traditionally generated crime statistics. The possibility arises that the crime drop is a consequence, in part, of an incremental shift of criminal behavior out from under police surveillance or auspices, and into the online realm. Present data render this proposition untestable, but of critical importance to researchers.
Given the substantial number of people affected and the huge amounts of financial losses caused, as well as the organized nature of crime markets for online theft, the U.S. criminal justice system needs a better way to incorporate information about OPC into its statistics on trends and patterns of crime. It's dangerous for researchers to come up with explanations for the crime drop by building theories based on assumptions about the nature of crime that are increasingly outdated, because the trends in criminality may be incorrectly described. The implication is a profound one: widespread criminological concern about the 'crime drop' may be based on misconceptions about the extent or even the existence of that drop itself. Next, we contemplate the challenges that will beset any attempt to incorporate online property crime into generalized crime measures.
Most attempts to count crime involve making the critical decision to count either incidents of offending or victimization, and OPC is no exception.
[ Table 4 about here]
One successful security breach of a network may only be a single offense, but its effects on victims may be widespread if millions of data records containing personal information are accessed by the hackers. Such a crime may expose millions of people to becoming potential victims of identity theft or account fraud (see Table 4 for the incidents with the largest volumes of financial/personal information exposed). (Cohen and Felson, 1979) that govern most of the traditional crime are substantially relaxed for OPC. Offenders may, and often do, reside in other countries halfway across the globe, whereas victims may be U.S. residents and businesses. Such crimes are particularly hard to solve, making data collection on offenders very complex. While certain offenders may be caught and portrayed in media, the profile of such individuals is likely to be highly unrepresentative of offenders generally. In short, data on offending itself is likely to be very hard to come by, and may transgress certain assumptions that underlie the attempt to produce a 'national' estimate of OPC prevalence. happened. These are the questions that need to be resolved for the purpose of developing a system of consistent OPC data.
An additional challenge results from the fact that businesses affected by OPC may be unwilling to come forward with information, in the effort to preserve their reputation and their customers' trust:
Banks and creditors typically do not notify the police about identity thefts, and police do not contact banks and creditors-and even if police did contact banks and creditors, there are no established procedures for the transfer of relevant information.
[…] In fact, there are indications that the private sector would rather keep this type of identity theft private, electing to address the control of the problem on its own. Many credit card companies and financial institutions view identity theft through a cost-benefit analysis, and the costs of implementing anti-identity theft measures exceed their benefits. (White and Fisher, 2008, p. 10) Other researchers also confirm the desire to conceal commercial victimization through data breaches (Clarke and Newman, 2002; Smith, 1999; Taylor, 2002) , and add that managers may doubt the ability of police to deal with the crime, which would require technologically advanced knowledge or equipment.
As a partial remedy for this problem, data breach laws requiring businesses to report any substantial security breaches have been passed in almost all U.S. states in the There is also a centralized database provided by a non-profit organization relying on volunteers that accumulates information on security breaches and on the number of personal and financial records exposed to online theft -DataLossDB.org project (Open Security Foundation, n.d.). Figure 1 plots the DataLossDB records of reported data breach incidents on a timeline: monthly number of incidents from 2005 to mid-2014 (latest available when the article went to press), regardless of the number of records stolen or exposed in each incident. In the period between 2009 and 2013, the increase looks exponential. Symantec (2012) estimates that in 2011, on average, 1.1 million identities got exposed per breach incident (p. 9), compared to 260,000 in 2010 (Symantec, 2011, p. 6 ).
[ Figure 1 about here] experiences. Despite the strong sampling procedure that was intended to produce solid national estimates (a stratified, random sample of nearly 36,000 businesses was selected), the response rate to this survey was only about 23%. Such a low response rate calls into question the generalizability of any estimates obtained from the survey, especially since it is not clear whether the businesses that responded were more or less or equally likely to be victimized compared to the businesses that gave no response to the survey.
It is also important to make a distinction between two types of cybercrime against organizations: 1) malicious attacks that are most similar to vandalism -computer viruses, denial of service, and other attacks designed to bring damage to the systems without the intent to profit financially from such damage, and 2) cybercrime that is perpetrated with the explicit intent to profit (designated as cyber theft in the BJS report (Rantala, 2008) ).
These two types of OPC (cyber-vandalism and cyber-theft) may have very different origins and types of perpetrators but both cause substantial financial losses to the organizations targeted.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: THE COUNTER-TRENDS AND INVISIBLE LINKS
While data and research in the area are incipient, the analysis above suggests there is ample reason to devote greater attention to counting OPC in order to assess whether the explosion in online property crime in the United States is so great as to reverse the commonly observed 'crime drop' since the mid-1990s. The data presented here suggest that the rate at which United States residents are now affected by OPC actually outstrips that of traditional property crime, which continues to fall. Moreover, the amount of financial harm they suffer is far greater in dollar amounts than that inflicted by traditional property crime. Existing data allow us to suggest the possibility that this 'wave' in crime may override any benefits Americans have enjoyed as a result of the steady drop in traditional forms of property crime recorded in the UCR. but have consistently wrestled with the conundrum of how to count criminality which is, in effect, spread out over several acts such as spree or serial/repeat offenses. Of course, the effect of a decision to count a series of offenses as 'one' offense has a radical effect on crime counts. OPC is no different in this regard, though the ability to collect millions of records in a single data breach raise the possibility that the measurement implications are much more dramatic. With offenders operating computer systems that seek continually to hack and subsequently to exploit personal data, it is hard to say when one offense ends and another begins. Stealing credit cards may be one criminal act, but in using them one may commit many more.
When it comes to counting 'the victim' and, relatedly, 'the victimization', the same problem occurs. Finding a way to compute OPC rates of either prevalence or harm in a way that permits them to be 'compared' or 'collated' in some way to figures related to traditional property crime may one day be possible, therefore, but only after a series of decisions has been made on how to define the units of count in ways that are broadly acceptable to the criminological community. The sense in which these figures can indeed be 'collated' meaningfully with existing measures such as the UCR 'index crime' rate, however, will depend heavily not only upon the compatibility of the counting rules with those employed for traditional crime (about which there will no doubt be considerable debate) but also whether criminologists themselves can be convinced that such a collation is wise.
Stepping back from the conceptual issues that this question elicits, however, one can at least return to the preliminary assertion that underlies this paper: namely that increases in OPC may not only be large enough to merit policy attention but also that they may exist in contrasting relation to trends in traditional property crime. As artefactual as such a relationship may be and as tentative as the suggestion must be, given the state of existing data, one urgent question may be to examine the data further for any such relationship and the mechanisms that might underlie it. Obviously, there are many possible causal relationships between OPC and traditional property crime, including some compatible with the suggestion that their countervailing trends are evidence of some interaction. We can speculate that engrossment in online media may cause criminals to change their methods strategically. Simultaneously, fewer real-world interactions may occur, reducing opportunities for traditional property crime to occur. The theoretical implications of such relationships for our understanding of the crime drop itself may be multi-faceted and certainly warrant further exploration. For example, some direct-contact predatory crimes may turn violent precisely because of the proximity of the offender and victim in time and space. This is not so true for cyber predatory crimes since the two never meet in person. So, one indirect consequence of property crimes occurring online could be a drop in the violent crime rate. Of course, some violent crimes may occur online as would be the case with cyber bullying and sexual predators of minors. But they may also escape the notice of the police. Alternatively, time spent online by most youth of the peak crime-prone age is seen by some researchers as a self-incapacitation mechanism, leading to the decrease in traditional crimes (Ward, 2011) .
In short, available data raise the possibility OPC is a growing problem and that, whether incorporated into index crime measures or not, criminologists would be wise to be circumspect before declaring that crime has dropped as radically as traditional measures appear to reflect. The scope for new measurement techniques to capture OPC is clearly wide, as work in the area has barely begun and definitional questions remain pressing. Most importantly, however, the theoretical implications of incorporating an understanding of OPC into observations of crime trends generally are that criminologists must revisit the fundamental assumptions that have underpinned approaches to measuring crime that stretch back for the entire history of the discipline. 
